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Abstract
This paper provides estimates of the redistribution and risk sharing across regional jurisdictions 
accomplished by the public sector in Italy. In this analysis the multi-level structure of the Italian 
government and the financial relations which link the different layers of government are explicitly 
considered. Using panel data for the period 1996-2002 we find that public policies in Italy 
significantly reduce differences in per-capita GDP across regions. However public budget, far from 
providing insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, greatly emphasizes income fluctuations across 
regions.
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La redistribution régionale et le partage des risques en Italie:
le rôle des divers niveaux d’administration.
Arachi et al.
Cet article cherche à fournir des estimations de la redistribution et du partage des risques à travers 
des circonscriptions d’action régionale et réalisés par le secteur public italien. Cette analyse 
approfondit la structure à niveaux multiples de l’administration italienne et examine ouvertement 
les rapports financiers qui relient les divers niveaux d’administration. A partir des données 
provenant des enquêtes permanentes pour la période de 1996 à 2002, il s’avère que les politiques 
publiques en Italie réduisent sensiblement les écarts du PIB régional par tête. Cependant, les 
dépenses publiques, loin de fournir une protection contre des chocs particuliers, soulignent les 
fluctuations du revenu à travers les régions.
Politique fiscale / Redistribution / Partage des risques / Rapports entre les niveaux d’administration 
/ Régions
Classement JEL: E62; H23; H50; H70
Redistribución regional y riesgo compartido en Italia: el rol de los diferentes niveles de 
gobierno
Giampaolo Arachi, Caterina Ferrario and Alberto Zanardi
Abstract
En este artículo ofrecemos las estimaciones de la redistribución y el riesgo compartido en 
varias jurisdicciones regionales del sector público en Italia. En este análisis se consideran 
expresamente la estructura multinivel del gobierno italiano y las relaciones financieras 
vinculadas a los diferentes estratos de gobierno. Con ayuda de datos de panel para el
periodo 1996-2002 observamos que las políticas públicas en Italia reducen 
considerablemente las diferencias entre los niveles del PIB per cápita en las regiones. Sin 
embargo, en el presupuesto público, lejos de ofrecer un seguro contra los choques 
idiosincrásicos, se acentúan en gran medida las fluctuaciones de ingresos en las 
regiones.
Keywords:
Política fiscal
Redistribución
Riesgo compartido
Relaciones intergubernamentales
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Regiones
JEL classification: E62, H23, H50, H70
Regionale Umverteilung und Risikoteilung in Italien: die Rolle der verschiedenen 
Regierungsebenen
Giampaolo Arachi, Caterina Ferrario and Alberto Zanardi
Abstract
In diesem Beitrag schätzen wir das Ausmaß der Umverteilung und Risikoteilung zwischen 
verschiedenen regionalen Rechtsprechungsgebieten des öffentlichen Sektors in Italien. 
Ausdrücklich in der Analyse berücksichtigt werden die mehrschichtige Struktur der 
italienischen Regierung sowie die finanziellen Beziehungen, die die verschiedenen 
Regierungsebenen miteinander verbinden. Anhand von Paneldaten für den Zeitraum von 
1996 bis 2002 stellen wir fest, dass die öffentlichen Politiken in Italien die Unterschiede 
des Pro-Kopf-BIP zwischen den Regionen signifikant verringern. Im öffentlichen Haushalt 
werden die Einkommensfluktuationen innerhalb der Regionen jedoch stark betont, statt 
eine Absicherung gegen idiosynkratische Störungen zu gewährleisten.
Keywords:
Steuerpolitik
Umverteilung
Risikoteilung
Beziehungen zwischen Regierungen
Regionen
JEL classification: E62, H23, H50, H70
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of recent theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal measures to 
redistribute income and mitigate asymmetric shocks between the regions of a national state or the 
states of a federation. Much interest was sparked by the run-up to the European Monetary Union in 
the 1990s, while early empirical studies on individual countries have focused on the US and 
Canada, only a few on other countries.
However, this literature does not adequately investigate how different institutional arrangements 
affect income redistribution and risk sharing. In countries with multi-level government structure, 
jurisdictions are interconnected in terms of financial flows by a variety of schemes. Generally they 
involve transfers from the central government budget to the other levels of government to reduce 
fiscal disparities between regions. The risk-sharing and redistributive properties of these schemes 
need to be considered separately.
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This is done here for Italy, a country with a particularly complex institutional structure in which 
intergovernmental relations are ruled by a number of different tax-sharing, revenue-sharing and 
grant arrangements. In addition, the last decade has witnessed a radical intergovernmental fiscal 
reform, increasing the tax autonomy of regional and local governments. Regional redistribution and 
risk sharing in Italy is of peculiar interest also because Italian regions differ enormously in size, 
population, demographic structure and level of economic development, in particular with its 
distinctive North-South disparity.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a critical review of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 sketches the main features of the Italian institutional framework with particular reference 
to the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 
discusses the specification of the econometric model that we use to derive a summary measure of 
the income redistribution and risk sharing produced by the fiscal system. The results are presented 
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The redistributive properties of the public budget have long been acknowledged (PERSSON and 
TABELLINI, 1996, p. 980). Recent research has also focused on the risk sharing (or insurance) that 
fiscal transfers may provide to sub-national (or federal) jurisdictions in the event of asymmetric 
income shocks. This “federal government smoothing” (ASDRUBALI et al., 1996) is one of the three 
channels for income smoothing, along with the capital and credit markets.
The redistribution of income among regions in a unitary or federal state generally aims at 
reducing ex-ante or long-term disparities. The policy tools used may be designed to redistribute 
income either between jurisdictions (intergovernmental equalization schemes) or between citizens 
living in different territories (social security schemes).
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In a multi-level government framework, taxes and intergovernmental transfers may also provide 
inter-regional insurance against asymmetric income shocks (temporary or permanent), thus 
smoothing income and consumption. A considerable body of literature on self-enforcing risk-
sharing agreements (KIMBALL, 1988; COATE and RAVALLION, 1993, KOCHERLAKOTA, 1996)
supports the conclusion that it is optimal for individual jurisdictions to enter an inter-regional 
insurance scheme even when they are risk-averse, provided that risks are to some degree 
independent. In addition, inter-regional insurance mechanisms are advocated by the literature on 
optimal currency areas (KENEN, 1969).
Early studies of risk sharing examined interstate insurance in federal states, mainly the US 
(SALA-I-MARTIN and SACHS, 1992; VON HAGEN, 1992; ASDRUBALI et al., 1996). Interest in income 
and consumption smoothing through the public budget was prompted by European integration, 
which deprived states in the euro-area of monetary policy power and allowed only limited scope for 
national borrowing to respond to asymmetric shocks. In this framework, euro-area states cannot 
deploy the traditional policy tools, so risk sharing at the EU level, through federal taxes and 
transfers, is acknowledged as a necessary feature of monetary unions (EICHENGREEN, 1993; FATÁS
et al., 1998).
The extent of redistribution and risk sharing across regions has been measured empirically in a 
number of works, initially concerned with the degree of income equalization and smoothing within 
currency unions. Early studies focused on the US (SALA-I-MARTIN and SACHS, 1992; VON HAGEN, 
1992; ASDRUBALI et al., 1996), on the US and Canada (BAYOUMI and MASSON, 1995), or on the 
US, Canada and the UK (GOODHART and SMITH, 1993). Later, the concern for the future prospects 
of EMU member states fostered a wave of studies on European countries, either comparing them 
with the US or Canada (ITALIANER and PISANY-FERRY, 1992, on the US, France and Germany; 
MÉLITZ and ZUMER, 2002, on the US, Canada, France and Germany; OBSTFELD and PERI, 1998, on 
the US, Canada and European countries; PADOVANO, 2007, on the US and Italy) or focusing on 
selected countries, such as Italy (DECRESSIN, 2002), or Italy and the UK (DEDOLA et al., 1999).
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The first wave of empirical studies raised a number of methodological issues in that, despite 
their similar econometric strategies, they reached conflicting results on the degree of redistribution 
and risk sharing in the US. Estimates of risk sharing across states in the US range from as low as 
10-15% (VON HAGEN, 1992; ITALIANER and PISANI-FERRI, 1992; ASDRUBALI et al., 1996; MÉLITZ 
and ZUMER, 1998) to as high as 30-40% (SALA-I-MARTIN and SACHS, 1992; BAYOUMI and MASSON,
1995). MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002) argued that these discrepancies could reflect the differing 
accounting criteria used to select the data. Essentially all studies regress a regional “economic 
activity” variable (output or income) including net transfers from the public sector on the same 
regional variable before transfers.1
The first crucial choice is therefore the “activity” variable, which is sometimes personal income 
and sometimes GDP. The latter is obviously more comprehensive, comprising items (e.g. 
depreciation) that are not counted in measuring personal income. The second choice relates to the 
definition of net transfers from the public sector, and is again between “narrow” measures (direct 
taxes and money transfers to households only) and “broader” ones (also including transfers in kind, 
public consumption and investments). As is illustrated by MÉLITZ (2004), these two choices 
significantly affect the estimated magnitude of redistribution and risk sharing. Specifically, 
combining a “narrow” measure of net transfers (e.g. money transfers net of taxes) with a “broad” 
measure of regional activity (e.g. GDP) leads to an underestimation of the degree of risk sharing; 
the opposite may result in an overestimation. Accordingly, to avoid misestimation, the measures 
used should be chosen for consistency: both activity and transfers should be gauged either narrowly 
or broadly.
As to the measure of transfers, DECRESSIN (2002) argues convincingly that the public sector 
impact cannot be captured by direct taxes and money transfers alone. A substantial factor in 
redistribution and risk sharing is the impact of transfers in kind, public consumption and 
investments. So we follow DECRESSIN (2002) in defining net transfers in terms of fiscal residua. 
The fiscal residuum by a specific level of government is given by the difference between its total 
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public expenditure (net of interest payments and transfers to other levels of government) and its 
total revenues (net of transfers from other levels of government).2 Taking this “broad” notion of net 
transfers, for consistency we take GDP as our measure of economic activity.
In addition to the overall impact of public policies, the literature has also investigated the 
differential effects of specific instruments (direct taxes, social insurance, transfers and grants). 
Studies on direct taxes and money transfers have generally found that redistribution is mainly 
driven by direct taxation, with social insurance, transfers and grants playing at most a minor role 
(SALA-I-MARTIN and SACHS, 1992; VON HAGEN, 1992; BAYOUMI and MASSON, 1995). A noteworthy 
exception is the work of MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002), which found the opposite result for US and 
Canadian data. DECRESSIN (2002), using a broader definition of net government transfers that also 
includes public consumption and investment plus subsidies to firms and indirect taxes, showed that 
in Italy most inter-regional redistribution stems from public expenditure, while the estimated 
contribution of revenue is modest. 
The results on the composition of the risk-sharing effect are mixed. SALA-I-MARTIN AND SACHS 
(1992) and VON HAGEN (1992) on the US and ANDERSSON (2004) on Sweden found that most 
income smoothing across regions is due to the tax system, while the role of transfers is minor. But 
BAYOUMI and MASSON (1995) and MÉLITZ AND ZUMER (2002) provided evidence, based on US and 
Canadian data, that transfers are the largest component in risk sharing. For Italy, DECRESSIN (2002) 
found that public consumption plays the main role in risk sharing and, in contrast with the rest of 
the literature, that fiscal revenues (and also public investment) amplify the effects of regional 
shocks on economic activity. 
However, a major shortcoming seems to affect the existing literature: it does not pay sufficient 
attention to one important institutional profile, namely the role of the different tiers of government. 
This is surprising, as some of these studies suggest that the distribution of powers among different 
tiers of government may affect the magnitude of fiscal flows for risk-sharing purposes (BAYOUMI 
and MASSON, 1995; ANDERSSON, 2004). Regional and local government taxes and expenditures are 
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clearly irrelevant to inter-regional redistribution and risk sharing when each authority’s budget is 
fully financed by own revenues. In most countries, however, budgets are interdependent by virtue 
of different transfer schemes, mostly involving the central government but sometimes directly 
connecting different local or regional units. In such a framework the policies of regional and sub-
regional governments may take on an inter-regional dimension.
This point was partially acknowledged by BUETTNER (2002) who analysed the income-
smoothing effect of fiscal equalization across West German Länders. He found that almost half of 
the risk sharing accomplished by the public sector is due to the transfers via the system of fiscal 
equalization.
However, Buettner’s approach is not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, his distinction 
between own taxes, tax sharing and transfers in the budget of sub-regional governments is not really 
relevant to measuring the amount of resources transferred from one region to another. For example, 
consider a country where sub-national governments have no taxing power and are financed entirely 
by central government transfers. If a tax is devolved to them and transfers reduced by an amount 
that exactly matches the yield of the new tax, region by region, there will be no change in the inter-
regional allocation of resources.
Second, there is an important distinction that Buettner’s paper overlooks, namely whether the 
purpose of the inter-regional flows is to offset “vertical” or “horizontal” fiscal imbalances. Vertical 
imbalance refers to the fact that even if the budget of the public sector overall is balanced, any 
given level of government may be in surplus or in deficit. Horizontal imbalance refers to the 
differences between revenues and expenditures of different jurisdictions at the same tier of
government. In this case, transfers operate even if that level has a balanced budget in the aggregate. 
Vertical and horizontal imbalances are addressed by different policy instruments in different 
countries. In a few cases (such as Germany) each type of imbalance is corrected by separate policy 
measures: vertical imbalance by tax-sharing or grants from the centre; horizontal, by transfers from 
the regions with greater fiscal capacity to those with less. More frequently (as in Australia, Canada 
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and Italy) vertical and horizontal imbalances are dealt with together through an integrated system of 
equalization transfers from the central government. In these cases, a transfer from the central 
government to sub-national governments can be always disaggregated into a vertical component 
(“vertical fiscal flows”) to produce the desired total amount of resources for the sub-national 
governments in the aggregate, and a horizontal one (“horizontal fiscal flows”), which redistributes 
across sub-national jurisdictions within a given level of government.
We develop an approach to take into account the foregoing. First, we analyse Italian public 
intervention by calculating regional fiscal residua separately for each level of government. Then we 
break these inter-regional fiscal flows down into a vertical and a horizontal component and measure 
the role of each in redistribution and risk sharing.
3. THE ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Italy is marked by stark structural and economic disparities between regions. Table 1 shows that 
regions differ widely in surface area (a relevant feature for economies of scale in public production) 
and in population density and age structure (the population is substantially younger in the South 
than in the North, with obvious impacts on health care and pension expenditures). And regional 
disparities in economic development are considerably more pronounced than in other European 
countries (SINN and WESTERMANN, 2001). Moving from the northern to the southern regions, per 
capita GDP is cut in half, with inevitable impact on fiscal capacity. This geographical dualism 
explains, inter alia, the particular emphasis, in the Italian political debate, on inter-regional 
redistribution.
TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Page 9 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres  Email: regional.studies@newcastle.ac.uk
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
10
Italy has three main tiers of government – central, regional (including regions and local health 
units) and local (including provinces and municipalities) – plus the nationwide social security 
system (pensions and unemployment insurance). There are 15 ordinary statute regions, 5 special 
statute regions3, 102 provinces, and more than 8,000 municipalities ranging in size from small 
towns to large cities.
Sub-national governments enjoy significant autonomy in both expenditure and revenue, but it is 
not easy to describe the specific assignment of expenditure responsibilities and taxing powers 
because of the strong financial relations between the various tiers of government. Table 2 gives an 
overview of revenues, expenditures and deficits of general government and its main components 
(central government, sub-national authorities, social security institutions) in 2002.4
TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The Italian public sector is quite large by international standards. Including intergovernmental 
transfers, nearly half of both expenditures and revenues can be imputed to central government, the 
rest being divided roughly equally between sub-national governments and social security 
institutions (Table 2). Budgets for all the levels of government are near balance. However, this 
picture changes dramatically when intergovernmental transfers are netted out. The expenditures of 
both sub-national governments and social security institutions greatly exceed own revenues (by 
respectively 5.7 and 4.0 percentage points of GDP)5; the opposite holds for central government. 
This means that the deficits of sub-national governments and social security institutions are 
essentially covered by central government transfers; as a consequence, the fiscal deficit arises 
almost entirely at central level (vertical fiscal imbalances). Moreover, Italy has no explicit scheme 
of direct transfers between different jurisdictions at the same sub-national level of government 
(regions, provinces or municipalities). Therefore transfers from the centre also serve to reduce 
horizontal fiscal imbalances.
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Table 3 reports the composition of the financing of public expenditure (gross of transfers) by the 
various fiscal instruments (taxes, social security contributions, transfers, other revenues, deficit) for 
each level of government. Even after the massive decentralisation process of the 1990s,6 grants 
from other levels of government still provide a very substantial share of total revenues of sub-
national governments and social security institutions. The table also shows how limited local 
governments' dependence on the regions is: the bulk of their transfer revenues comes directly from 
central government.
TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
In assessing the role of a fiscal system in inter-regional redistribution and risk sharing, it should 
be stressed that central government grants result at least partially from equalising mechanisms. 
Basically, both for regional and for local governments, fiscal equalization consists in redistributing 
the yield of central government taxes to cover the difference between the expenditure requirements 
and the own tax capacity of regions and municipalities. Given the major role of transfers, one could 
further investigate the redistribution and income-smoothing effects of the public budget by looking 
directly at the taxes, contribution income and expenditures of the central government and the social 
security institutions (which operate nationwide) together with intergovernmental transfers 
(BUETTNER, 2002). However, the results would be misleading, as is explained in Section 2, since a 
series of recent reforms have replaced transfers from the central government with own taxes (or 
contributions) assigned to sub-national governments or social security institutions. So we shall look 
to the budgets of each individual level of government, considering the corresponding revenues and 
expenditures net of all transfers received from or paid to other levels. The methodology we develop 
for measuring the actual vertical and horizontal flows between regions is described in Section 4.
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4. THE DATA
Following DECRESSIN (2002), we analyse fiscal residua to evaluate redistribution and risk sharing 
by each tier of government. As noted, the fiscal residuum of a jurisdiction is the difference between 
the total expenditure of a specific tier of government (net of interest payments and transfers to other 
levels), which benefits the residents of that jurisdiction, and the total revenues (again net of 
transfers) collected from residents. A positive residuum means that the local residents benefit from 
resources provided by the rest of the country (expenditures in the jurisdiction exceed revenues 
collected there); a negative residua means that the territory gives up part of its resources to finance 
expenditures elsewhere.
The data are taken from the Territorial Public Accounts (TPA) produced by the Italian Ministry 
of Economy7. They give the allocation of the revenue and expenditure flows of each level of 
government (central, regional, local, social security institutions) for the 20 Italian regions for the 
period 1996-2002.
The TPA are based on the general government budget on a cash basis. In this respect, our data 
differ from those used by DECRESSIN (2002), i.e. the territorial economic accounts for Italian 
general government, which are available on an accrual basis for the period 1983-1992. In the TPA, 
the regionalisation of public flows is derived by treating each region as if it were a separate 
economy with its own public administration, subject to the constraint that for each variable the 
figures for the regions must add up to the national, general government figure. The main problem is 
attributing the spending of central government and social security institutions to the regions. In 
these accounts, expenditure flows are regionalised according to what we can call the expenditure 
principle: they are imputed to the territory where the means of production for the relevant public 
services and investments are located. However, this allocation of expenditures may differ 
significantly from the territorial location of the benefits from the expenditure (the benefit principle). 
For this reason, the original dataset has been adjusted to fit our requirements by two different 
procedures. First, for central government expenditures, consistency between the two principles 
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depends on the nature of the publicly provided goods. For pure national public goods, public 
intervention benefits all citizens equally, so the regionalisation of financial flows according to the 
expenditure principle does not coincide with that according to the benefit principle. For publicly 
provided private goods, however, it may be presumed that the expenditure principle largely matches 
the benefit principle. Accordingly, we revised central government expenditures by the following:
- in the case of pure national public goods, total expenditures were regionalised 
according to the population distribution;
- in the case of publicly provided pure private goods, the regionalisation of the TPA 
was retained;
- in the case of publicly provided mixed goods, featuring both public and private 
characteristics, our rule-of-thumb was to apply the population criterion and the expenditure 
principle in equal proportions.
The TPA also needed revision with reference to regional governments’ health services 
expenditure (which accounts for nearly 80% of total regional budgets). These flows, regionalised 
according to the expenditure principle, were attributed entirely to the regional jurisdiction 
responsible for the expenditure (where the services are provided), regardless of where the patients 
actually reside. This distinction proves to be significant in Italy, where there is considerable inter-
regional mobility of National Health Service patients (especially from southern to northern regions). 
To measure the real benefits of health care to residents in each jurisdiction, the raw data on regional 
expenditures were adjusted for net expenditures for inter-regional patient mobility, determined, for 
each region, as expenditures for services to non-residents less expenditures by other regions for 
services to the region’s own residents.
We generate two sets of fiscal residua. First they are straightforwardly calculated for each tier of 
government j, year t and region i as:
Rijt = Gijt – Tijt
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where Gijt is total public non-interest expenditure (net of transfers to other levels of government) 
and Tijt total revenues (net of incoming transfers). The second set adjusts this first set of residua to 
distinguish vertical from horizontal financial flows, i.e. transfers between different tiers of 
government and those redistributing revenues among regions at the same level.
The numerical transposition procedure for generating this second set of residua is as follows. 
Horizontal flows for each region are calculated in such a way as to reach a nationwide balanced 
budget for each level of government; the fiscal residuum of each region is increased (or decreased) 
when that tier of government is in surplus (or deficit) at nationwide level i.e. it has a negative (or 
positive) residuum. For the central government, which typically has more revenues than required to 
finance its own expenditure, the revenues pertaining to each region are reduced proportionally so 
that total revenues equal total expenditures for the aggregate of the 20 regions. Then if, after this 
correction, region i has a positive residuum, this means that central government expenditure there is 
funded in part by revenues raised by the central government in other regions, once central 
government revenues that go to finance other levels of government are subtracted. Therefore, the 
new residua represent the horizontal flows of resources resulting from central government policies, 
net of resources collected and transferred to other levels of government.
Formally, let TiCt and GiCt respectively be central government fiscal revenue and expenditure in 
region i in year t. The fiscal residua that measure horizontal flows through the central government 
are then defined as:
RHiCt = GiCt –  TiCt
where 


=
== 20
1
20
1
i
i
Ct
i
i
Ct
t
T
G
 .
The remaining tiers of government (regional, local and social security) typically record deficits 
(i.e. positive fiscal residua) at the nationwide level, as they generally benefit from transfers from the 
central government. In this case the procedure is the reverse. To isolate horizontal flows, for each 
level of government, the expenditures of each territory are proportionally reduced so as to achieve a 
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balanced budget over the sum of the 20 regions for that level. As before, the resulting residua for 
each region and each level of government represent the horizontal flows from a given level of 
government, net of expenditures financed by transfers from other levels.
The new residua for government level j in year t are defined as:
RHijt = jtGijt –Tijt
where 


=
== 20
1
20
1
i
i
jt
i
i
jt
jt G
T
 .
Finally, the flows of resources between tiers of government – vertical flows – are derived as a 
by-product of the above procedure. The associated fiscal residua are computed as the difference 
between, on the one hand, the total amount of expenditures subtracted from the budget of sub-
national governments and, on the other hand, the total amount of reductions applied to central 
government revenues to isolate horizontal flows. The fiscal residua due to vertical flows are thus 
those associated with the portion of expenditure programs that sub-national governments and social 
security institutions finance via revenue raised by the central government. 
Formally we define the fiscal residua due to vertical flows, RVit, as follows:
( ) ( ) iCtt
j
i
jtjt
i
t TGRV  = 11 . 
Tables 4 and 5 describe, respectively, the two sets of fiscal residua through the fundamental 
statistics (mean and standard deviation), calculated in per capita terms. In Table 4, which refers to 
the first set of residua, general government as an aggregate shows a substantial primary surplus (i.e., 
net of interest payments) averaging 825 euro per capita. This surplus is due to the above discussed 
exclusion of interest on public debt from our definition of public expenditure. The overall surplus 
results from the combination of the considerable central government surplus (about 3,500 euro per 
capita) and deficits at all other tiers of government (regional, local and social security). This pattern 
highlights the key feature of the Italian system of intergovernmental relations mentioned in Section 
3: despite the decentralisation in the last decade, most public revenue is collected by the central 
government and allocated to the other tiers via different systems of intergovernmental transfers.
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A comparison of the residua in different regions gives a preliminary picture of the main patterns 
characterising of inter-regional fiscal flows in Italy. First, there is substantial redistribution from the 
wealthier to the poorer jurisdictions (i.e. those with per capita GDP above or below the national 
average). Moreover, the size of the residua is to some extent correlated with the surface area of the 
region – generally higher in smaller regions (Liguria, Umbria, Marche, Molise, Basilicata). In 
addition, there are sizeable financial transfers from the ordinary statute to the special statute regions 
(Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia, Sardegna) irrespective of GDP. 
Finally, the variability of per capita residua over time differs considerably from region to region. As 
regards general government, this variability seems to be positively correlated with per capita GDP. 
Residua are generally larger in richer regions. However, if we examine the standard deviation of 
general government fiscal residua along with that of GDP for each region, no clear pattern emerges. 
In some regions, high or low GDP variability is matched by high or low fiscal residua variability, 
but in others the reverse holds. Accordingly, the data give no clear indication on the risk-sharing 
role of the public budget. But it is worth noticing that with few exceptions local government residua 
show very low variability, suggesting that this level accomplishes very little smoothing, if any.
TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE
For horizontal flows only, Table 5 shows a strong redistributive impact of central government. 
Except for Lazio, all the regions with above-average GDP transfer resources to the regions whose 
GDP is below the average. And there is evidence of horizontal redistribution also for regional and 
local governments. Horizontal redistribution by social security institutions is highly polarised, with 
only five regions providing net financing to the others. The last column of the table shows that a 
good portion of inter-regional redistribution is generated by spending programmes run by sub-
national governments and social security institutions but financed by central government.
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TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE
5. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The literature generally relates redistribution to public programmes aiming at offsetting long-run 
regional income differentials, while risk sharing refers to short-term relief from asymmetric shocks. 
Though tenuous in theory – as redistribution can be simply seen as risk sharing over a longer time 
span (OBSTFELD and PERI, 1998; DECRESSIN, 2002; VARIAN, 1980) – this partition can be useful in 
analysing the effects of public policy.8
The literature has taken two main econometric approaches. That proposed by OBSTFELD and
PERI (1998) and applied to Italian data by DECRESSIN (2002) estimates a bivariate VAR. The 
amount of redistribution is recovered from the estimated steady state relationship between the 
regional “activity” variable plus fiscal residuum and the regional activity variable alone; risk 
sharing is measured by the contemporary response or from the impulse responses of the two 
variables (DECRESSIN, 2002). 
In the second approach the degree of redistribution and the degree of risk sharing are estimated 
separately, with two different regressions. With reference to redistribution, VON HAGEN (1992) 
regresses annual values of taxes and transfers in levels on annual values of incomes.
A more common specification is that suggested by BAYOUMI and MASSON (1995), which resorts 
to long-run average levels:
iii xy  ++= 11 (1)
where overscored variables denote averages over time and all variables have been divided by 
nationwide values to control for shocks that are common to all regions and that may be absorbed via 
the national budget, i.e.:
 =
= 20
1i it
it
it
X
X
x , 
 =
= 20
1i it
it
it
Y
Yy
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where Xit is per capita GDP in region i and year t, while Yit, is given by Xit plus the fiscal 
residuum.
The amount of redistribution is given by 1 – 1: a region with income or output 1 euro higher-
than-average ends up with disposable resources 1 – 1 euro higher-than-average, implying a 
redistribution of 1% of income or output.
As for the evaluation of risk sharing, a widely used functional specification is BAYOUMI and
MASSON (1995):
ititiit xy 
 ++= 1 (2)
where xit and yit refer to income or output of region i at time t, respectively before and after net 
public transfers, and  denotes first differences at time t.
MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002) show d that (2) is equivalent to:
itiitiit xxyy  += )(2 (3)
when i is equal to zero (where y  and x  denote average values over time).
The same authors note that equations (1) and (3) can be summarised in one single equation 
yielding the same estimates for the relevant parameters: 
itiitiit xxxy  +++= )(211 (4)
The degree of risk sharing, like redistribution, will be measured by 1 – 1 or 1 – 2.
In this paper we take this second approach, estimating redistribution and risk sharing separately 
by using the fiscal residua as a gauge of public sector impact. However, in our view the 
specification based on (1) and (2) or (3) is not entirely satisfactory for data, like ours, that display 
regional trends.
To illustrate this point, we must first formally define our variables. Our measure of economic 
activity is a broad one, namely regional per capita GDP. Figure 1 shows the values of per capita 
GDP for the largest northern region, Lombardia, and for a large southern one, Campania. On 
average, over the estimation period per capita GDP in Lombardia is 30% above the national mean, 
but it displays a clear downward trend. For Campania, the reverse pattern holds: per capita GDP 
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averages 35% below the national mean, but with a clear upward trend. Given these regional trends, 
it would be inappropriate to take the average values over the entire estimation period to distinguish 
between redistribution and risk sharing, as is assumed in equations (1) and (3).
FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Accordingly we propose a variant of MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002), where in equations (1) and (3) 
the averages of y and x are replaced by their trends. In order to isolate the trend and the cyclical 
component we apply the HODRICK and PRESCOTT (1997) filter, region by region, to both the x and y
series.9 Then we run the following two regressions to estimate, respectively, the redistributive and 
risk-sharing effects of public intervention, as measured by the fiscal residuum:
ititit xy µ ++= ~~ 22 (5)
ititititit xxyy  += )~(~ 3 (6)
where trend components are denoted by tildes. Like equations (1) and (3), these two equations 
may be summarised in one single equation: 
itiitiit xxxy  +++= )~(~ 322 . (7)
6. RESULTS
Our regression results are reported in Table 6. The upper part shows the coefficients when fiscal 
residua are calculated without separating vertical from horizontal flows (see Table 4). The lower 
part presents the regression results when the two types of flow are distinguished and the fiscal 
residua are those described in Table 5. To measure the impact of each tier of government, we run a 
series of regressions – adopting both the definitions of fiscal residua – starting with one level of 
government (central) and then sequentially adding to the dependent variable the fiscal residua of 
successive levels. We also disaggregate the fiscal residua by considering first, as an endogenous 
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variable, per capita GDP less revenue and then per capita GDP less revenue plus expenditure (i.e. 
per capita GDP plus the fiscal residuum).
TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE
6.1 REDISTRIBUTION
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show the degree of inter-regional redistribution measured by an 
OLS estimate of equation (5). An OLS estimate of equation (1) results in the same degree of 
redistribution, so the latter results are not reported here. 
The estimate for inter-regional redistribution by general government amounts to 27.6% of GDP 
(column 2, row 4), which is remarkably close to the value of 24.5% found by DECRESSIN (2002) for 
the period 1983-1992 using specification (1).
Our dataset enables us to extend Decressin’s analysis by isolating the contribution of each tier of 
government to the total redistribution effected by general government. The first row in column (2) 
reports the value of the estimated coefficient when the dependent variable is per capita GDP plus 
the central government fiscal residuum. This coefficient, then, is a measure of the redistribution 
generated by this level of government alone.
In the second row the regional government fiscal residuum is added to the dependent variable. 
The difference between the coefficient in the first row and that in the second measures the 
redistributive effect of regional government programmes. Adding in the fiscal residua of the other 
tiers one by one, we can measure the redistribution effected by local government and social 
security.
Examining first the upper part of the table (where horizontal and vertical flows are considered 
jointly), the coefficients show that all levels except the regions contribute positively to income 
redistribution. The estimated value of 1–2 rises when both the local government and the social 
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security fiscal residua are added in turn, suggesting that these tiers of government redistribute 
income across territories; but when the fiscal residuum of the regional governments is added, the 
coefficient falls, implying that the overall impact of regional government intervention is regressive. 
In any case, the impact of those levels of government is modest. Most of the redistribution is due to 
central government, which redistributes 25.7% of per capita GDP.
Separating horizontal from vertical flows (lower part of Table 6), OLS estimates show that most 
of inter-regional redistribution is accomplished through horizontal flows, which redistribute 25.1% 
of GDP. Vertical flows account for only 2.5% (i.e., the difference between the horizontal flows’ 
contribution and overall redistribution by general government), or less than a tenth of the total 
redistributive effect. When levels of government are considered separately, the effects of horizontal 
flows are not significantly different from those of total flows (vertical plus horizontal): most of the 
redistribution between regions results from central government, which redistributes 19.4% of GDP. 
Again, local governments and social security institutions play a limited role and regional 
government policies are somewhat regressive.
Further insights come from an analysis of the relative contributions of revenues and 
expenditures to inter-regional redistribution. Column (1) of Table 6 reports the coefficients 
estimated when the endogenous variable is per capita GDP less revenues. Those coefficients 
provide a measure of the redistributive impact of taxes and social security contributions levied by 
the different tiers of government. The difference, row by row, between the values of column (1) and 
of column (2) measures the redistribution brought about by public expenditure. Inspection of the 
upper part of Table 6 shows that central government taxes and contributions (row 1) play a limited 
role (5.9% of GDP) in redistributing resources across territories. The bulk of the redistribution by 
central government is accomplished by public expenditure. Revenues always contribute positively 
to redistribution at each level of government. The redistributive impact of expenditures by the other 
tiers is quite limited or even, as in the case of the regions, regressive.
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In what follows we seek to interpret the results reported in the lower part of Table 6. We recall 
that the horizontal inter-regional flows generated by the central government have been determined 
by a proportional reduction of the revenues accruing to that level of government, as described in 
Section 4. This explains why when horizontal flows are considered in isolation the degree of 
redistribution accounted for by central government taxes and contributions is more than halved, 
from 5.9% in row (1) to 2.3% in row (5). The same argument explains why the overall impact of the 
central government (and of general government overall) remains large when the focus is on 
horizontal flows (row 5, column 2): the main redistributive component of public policies (i.e. 
expenditures) is still entirely included in the fiscal residuum.
The result – that general government expenditure and revenues are significant channels of inter-
regional redistribution in Italy – is consistent with the findings of DECRESSIN (2002). What is novel 
in our analysis is the evidence on the role of each tier of government in total redistribution. 
Specifically, we show the large part played by taxes and contributions (15.4% of GDP), especially 
when levied by regional and local governments and by social security institutions, and the 
regressive effect of regional expenditure programmes. 
6.2 RISK SHARING
Columns (3) to (8) of Table 6 report the estimated coefficients under the three different 
specifications discussed in Section 5. First look at the upper section of the table, with the results for 
total flows (horizontal plus vertical). The MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002) approach, based on equation 
(3) (columns (3) and (4)) yields an estimate for overall risk sharing provided by general government 
of 35.4% (column (4)) which is considerably higher than the values found by DECRESSIN (2002), 
which range from 8% to 15% for the period 1983-1992.
The most interesting result, though, is that the other two specifications lead to the opposite 
conclusion. The fixed-effect estimate of equation (2) (columns (5) and (6)) gives a value of 1
greater than 1 for general government, implying that public intervention has an overall risk-
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enhancing effect on the economy. Even more surprising is the magnitude of the effect: idiosyncratic 
shocks are amplified by 40.3% (column (6)).
The OLS estimate of equation (6) (columns (7) and (8)) confirms the risk-enhancing impact of 
public policies, though to a smaller extent (30.2%; column 8). 
This striking variance in the estimates depends on the trends in regional variables discussed 
above. As explained in Section 5, with no regional trends in the data, equations (3) and (2) would 
yield the same estimates, while if the data show regional trends, equation (3) is mis-specified and 
the estimates are biased.
It is worth emphasising this point, in that MÉLITZ and ZUMER (2002) argued strongly that “[…] 
employing levels or first differences makes no difference at all” with supporting evidence from the 
US, Canada, France and UK. Their conclusion, diametrically opposite to our own, probably reflects 
the different period covered. Their observations span at least 16 years. Given that x and y are 
normalised to the national values, they are unlikely to show regional trends over such a long period. 
In fact, the relevance of regional trends when the time dimension is small also emerges from the 
evidence provided by DECRESSIN (2002) on a 9-year dataset. Using equation (3), he estimates risk 
sharing at 13.3%, but when regional trends are allowed for, using equation (2), that value drops, 
significantly, to 8%.
Having shown the importance of regional trends in analysing our own dataset, let us now focus 
on the specification of equation (6), which is more suitable to determining the income-smoothing 
effect of public policies against regional idiosyncratic shocks.
First, comparing columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 makes it clear that the risk-enhancing impact of
general government fiscal residua depends on the dynamics of revenue. The coefficient in row (4) 
falls from -45.7% to -30.2% when public expenditure is added to per capita GDP less revenue. This 
confirms the results of DECRESSIN (2002), who provides evidence of a pro-cyclical effect of taxes 
and contributions, albeit on a smaller scale than derived here.
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It is interesting to disaggregate the regional income-smoothing effect across tiers of government. 
Central government and social security institutions follow the pattern of general government as a 
whole, i.e. strongly risk-enhancing revenues and mildly risk-reducing expenditures; regional and 
local governments, the reverse: providing insurance through taxes but amplifying regional shocks 
through their expenditures.
The overall picture is thus complicated, and devising a consistent explanation for all these 
findings is not easy. One reason for the risk-amplifying effect of general government revenue may 
be the modest amount of direct taxation, which accounts for just one third of total Italian 
government revenues. The other two main sources of revenue, indirect taxes and social security 
contributions, are not directly correlated with income (and so may remain fairly stable in the face of 
a shock) and are moderately regressive. Another, more methodological, factor is our use of budget 
data on a cash basis. Firms and the self-employed pay taxes in three instalments. In June and 
November each year they make payments on account of their tax liability for the year, and in June 
of the following year they pay any balance due between the tax liability based on their tax returns 
for the past year and the sum of the payments on account. Account payments are based on the 
previous year’s income, so tax revenue from firms and the self-employed is lagged by one year with 
respect to income. This may be one reason why revenue does not decrease after a negative shock to 
regional income or increase after a positive one.
It is harder to explain why regional and local government revenues generate a risk sharing 
effect. The case of local governments is particularly puzzling, as their taxes are levied essentially on 
wealth (chiefly the municipal real estate tax), so that the base is relatively insulated from the 
economic cycle. As for regional governments some insights into revenue dynamics can be gained 
from an examination of the reforms enacted between 1996 and 2002. The regions were assigned 
new taxes (mainly a value added business tax) and a new system of inter-regional transfers was 
introduced (ARACHI and ZANARDI, 2004).
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Our last surprising result is the strong pro-cyclical impact of regional government expenditure. 
About 80% of regional budgets consist of National Health Service funding, which in theory should 
not be related to the cyclical component of regional GDP and should thus offer some insurance 
against idiosyncratic shocks. This clash between theory and empirical evidence is perhaps best 
explained by the repeated efforts of the central government to curb health spending, with measures 
that may have hit regions asymmetrically and thus accentuated negative shocks.
The lower part of Table 6 shows the relative contribution of horizontal and vertical flows. 
Redistribution is driven mainly by horizontal flows, risk sharing by vertical flows. The latter are 
strongly pro-cyclical, as they consist of fiscal residua computed as the difference between a share of 
regional, local, and social security expenditure (the first two pro-cyclical, the latter counter-cyclical) 
and a share of central government revenue (which is strongly pro-cyclical).
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we seek to measure income redistribution and risk sharing between Italian regions 
effected by the public sector. The multi-level structure of Italian government and the financial 
relations (in terms of tax-sharing and grants) that link the different tiers are considered explicitly. 
This allows us to break down the redistributive and income-smoothing effects of public policies 
according to the institutional units that effect them.
Using panel data for 1996-2002 we find that taxes and expenditures significantly reduce 
regional differences in per capita GDP. A region whose per capita GDP is 1 euro higher or lower 
than the national average ends up, after public intervention, about 72 cents higher or lower. Most of 
the redistributive impact is due to central government, while the contribution of local government 
and social security institutions is minor, and that of regions is regressive. Horizontal flows of 
resources across territories, those involving the same level of government, account for about 90% of 
total redistribution; just 10% comes from vertical flows, i.e. expenditures by sub-national 
governments financed by transfers from the central government. As for the relative effects of 
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specific fiscal instruments, the bulk of the redistribution comes via central government expenditure, 
while the spending of the other levels is distributionally neutral or even regressive. In terms of the 
total redistribution produced by each level of government, revenues are much more important for 
regional and local governments and social security institutions than for the central government. 
As for risk sharing, the public budget in Italy has no smoothing effects on regional economies 
hit by asymmetric, region-specific shocks. On the contrary, public policies greatly accentuate the 
variance of annual GDP across regions by about 30.2%. This risk-enhancing effect is driven mainly 
by the revenues of the central government, only partially offset by the income-smoothing behaviour 
of social security expenditures. The effects of regional and local government are quite modest and 
of opposite sign. Finally, our estimates highlight a sharp contrast between horizontal and vertical 
flows in terms of risk-sharing properties. The impact of the former is relatively minor and counter-
cyclical, that of the latter is substantial and strongly pro-cyclical.
An interesting area for future research is the links between inter-regional risk sharing and 
cyclical income-smoothing. A growing body of empirical literature (reviewed by EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2006) has found evidence of pro-cyclical use of fiscal policy in a number of 
industrialised countries, in particular during good times. Some of the explanations for this may also 
apply to the amplification of regional idiosyncratic shocks that we have documented here. For 
example, lags in revenue collection may explain both phenomena. However, it is not clear whether 
other sources of pro-cyclicality may also account for the pattern of regional risk sharing across tiers 
of government. For example, simple “political economy” explanations for the observed pro-cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy10 would imply the same behavioural pattern at all tiers of government, 
while our inquiry finds evidence of a diametrically opposite behaviour between central government 
and social security institutions on the one hand and regional and local governments on the other.
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Table 1: Regional indicators (2002)
Regions Surface area
 (Sq km) Population
Population 
density
Population 
<15 years (%)
Population 
>64 years (%)
GDP (millions 
of euro)
Per capita 
GDP 
(thousands of 
euro)
Per capita 
GDP (index)
Piemonte 25,399 4,270,215 168 12.0 21.3 106,200 24.9 114.3
Valle d'Aosta 3,262 122,040 37 12.9 19.5 3,374 27.6 127.1
Lombardia 23,857 9,246,796 388 13.2 18.2 255,086 27.6 126.8
Trentino-Alto Adige 13,619 962,464 71 16.0 17.1 27,284 28.3 130.3
Veneto 18,364 4,642,899 253 13.5 18.3 112,520 24.2 111.4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 7,845 1,198,187 153 11.4 21.6 29,683 24.8 113.9
Liguria 5,416 1,577,474 291 10.6 25.4 37,855 24.0 110.3
Emilia Romagna 22,123 4,080,479 184 11.6 22.3 110,659 27.1 124.6
Northern Italy 119,885 26,100,544 22 12.8 20.2 682,660 26.2 120.2
Toscana 22,992 3,566,071 155 11.7 22.3 84,942 23.8 109.5
Umbria 8,456 848,022 100 12.3 22.6 17,458 20.6 94.6
Marche 9,694 1,504,827 155 12.9 21.8 32,364 21.5 98.9
Lazio 17,203 5,205,139 303 14.1 17.7 130,012 25.0 114.8
Abruzzo 10,794 1,285,896 119 13.9 20.5 23,753 18.5 84.9
Central Italy 69,139 11,124,059 161 13.1 20.4 288,528 25.9 119.2
Molise 4,438 321,697 72 14.2 21.4 5,512 17.1 78.8
Campania 13,595 5,760,353 424 18.7 14.2 84,597 14.7 67.5
Puglia 19,348 4,040,990 209 16.8 15.8 60,057 14.9 68.3
Basilicata 9,992 597,000 60 15.7 18.7 9,261 15.5 71.3
Calabria 15,080 2,011,338 133 16.7 17.2 27,752 13.8 63.4
Sicilia 25,708 5,003,262 195 17.4 16.7 73,475 14.7 67.5
Sardegna 24,090 1,643,096 68 13.9 16.1 27,594 16.8 77.2
Southern Italy 112,251 20,663,632 184 16.7 16.7 288,249 13.9 64.1
Italy 301,277 57,888,245 192 14.3 18.9 1,259,437 21.8 100.0
Source: Istat
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Table 2: General government: expenditures, revenues and deficits by different levels of government (% GDP,  2002)
General 
government Central government Sub-national governments Social security institutions
gross of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
net of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
gross of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
net of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
gross of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
net of transfers 
from/to other 
public 
institutions
Total expenditures 47.4 27.4 16.9 14.7 14.7 16.1 15.9
Total revenues 44.5 24.4 24.2 13.9 8.1 17.1 12.4
Deficit -2.8 -3.0 7.3 -0.8 -6.5 0.9 -3.5
Source: Istat, Conti ed aggregati economici delle Amministrazioni pubbliche, SEC95 series 
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Table 3: Public sector: financing of total expenditures by institutional levels (% total expenditures, 2001)
Taxes Social security 
contributions Transfers from Other revenues Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central government (1) 78.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 10.7 10.2
Social security institutions (2) 0.0 70.1 27.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.0 0.0
Regions (3) 40.9 0.0 53.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 4.9 0.8
Local health units (4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 8.3 1.1
Provinces and Municipalities (5) 28.5 0.0 21.9 0.0 13.2 0.0 0.0 1.3 33.5 1.6
Other public institutions (6) 3.6 0.2 52.0 4.7 12.6 0.0 3.4 5.1 18.6 -0.2
Duplicative items 0.0 0.0 57.7 1.2 33.5 0.0 0.6 1.6 5.5 -0.1
Public sector 58.3 23.6 24.2 0.5 14.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 11.5 6.6
Source: Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Relazione Generale sulla Situazione Economica del Paese, Vol. III, Tab. Appendix SP.1 
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Table 4: Fiscal residua for different levels of government (per capita average values 1996-2002, euro 2002)
GDP General government Central government Regional government Local government Social security
Average Standard deviation Average
Standard 
deviation Average
Standard 
deviation Average
Standard 
deviation Average
Standard 
deviation Average
Standard 
deviation
Piemonte 24,168 884 -2,100 730 -4,671 436 678 162 495 57 1,397 279
Val D'Aosta 28,254 534 3,397 1,211 -5,682 491 6,046 840 1,421 302 1,612 201
Lombardia 27,152 624 -4,893 669 -6,430 404 806 193 264 223 466 260
Trentino Alto Adige 27,489 695 631 894 -5,604 444 4,581 430 1,298 178 356 235
Veneto 24,494 627 -2,841 558 -4,467 334 815 264 377 49 434 228
Friuli Venezia Giulia 23,720 875 -727 433 -4,519 357 1,534 256 659 75 1,599 194
Liguria 22,533 1,625 232 400 -4,131 358 955 184 583 98 2,824 274
Emilia Romagna 26,420 840 -3,180 491 -5,664 404 750 322 425 62 1,309 204
Toscana 22,993 953 -1,049 743 -4,107 289 857 579 589 70 1,612 222
Umbria 20,207 843 797 385 -2,865 291 799 92 945 171 1,918 175
Marche 21,201 677 -538 316 -3,330 332 929 255 565 96 1,298 166
Lazio 22,889 1,009 -2,252 653 -4,289 316 740 393 434 398 863 288
Abruzzo 18,042 744 779 456 -1,920 291 856 275 567 48 1,277 148
Molise 16,445 860 2,471 368 -897 190 1,363 191 718 78 1,287 182
Campania 13,363 760 1,927 379 -729 223 1,069 205 712 60 875 122
Puglia 13,865 786 1,689 261 -974 197 932 230 477 24 1,253 130
Basilicata 15,036 870 2,923 300 -286 250 1,299 276 891 61 1,018 146
Calabria 12,943 792 3,440 376 -106 254 1,514 187 711 46 1,321 136
Sicilia 13,938 742 2,846 338 -838 191 1,605 177 875 26 1,203 135
Sardegna 15,760 752 2,617 606 -1,377 316 1,894 369 924 51 1,176 162
Italy 20,890 818 -825 378 -3,499 282 1,053 149 553 64 1,068 176
Fiscal residuum = expenditure net of all transfers to other levels of government - revenue net of all transfers from other levels of government
Public expenditure excluding interest payments
Source: based on data from Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Conti pubblici territoriali and Istat, Conti territoriali
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Table 5: Vertical and horizontal flows in fiscal residuals (per capita average values 1996-2002, euro 2002)
Horizontal flows
General 
government Central 
government
Regional 
government Local government Social security
Vertical flows
Piemonte -2,100 -673 -215 -18 136 -1330
Val d'Aosta 3,397 -1,287 1,363 547 290 2484
Lombardia -4,893 -1,562 -187 -429 -703 -2012
Trentino Alto Adige 631 -1,262 1,288 350 -699 955
Veneto -2,841 -615 -92 -89 -564 -1482
Friuli Venezia Giulia -727 -481 246 9 240 -741
Liguria 232 -260 11 -83 1,327 -763
Emilia Romagna -3,180 -1,119 -280 -176 -19 -1586
Toscana -1,049 -335 -249 -30 367 -803
Umbria 797 353 -341 263 671 -148
Marche -538 68 -91 9 176 -700
Lazio -2,252 58 -136 -166 -546 -1462
Abruzzo 779 873 -36 101 299 -458
Molise 2,471 1,362 260 227 364 258
Campania 1,927 1,424 141 255 170 -63
Puglia 1,689 1,215 86 127 463 -204
Basilicata 2,923 1,713 155 355 229 471
Calabria 3,440 1,797 367 302 542 432
Sicilia 2,846 1,241 354 388 447 416
Sardegna 2,617 1,143 426 373 306 369
Italy -825 0 0 0 0 -825
Fiscal residuum = expenditure net of all transfers to other levels of government - revenue net of all transfers from other levels of government
Public expenditure excluding interest payments
Source: based on data from Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Conti pubblici territoriali and Istat, Conti territoriali
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Table 6: Degree of redistribution and risk sharing through fiscal flows (1996–2002)
Redistribution Risk sharing
Eq. (5) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (6)
1 – 2 1 – 2 1 – 1 1 – 3
Number of observations 140 140 120 140
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endogeneous variable
GDP 
minus 
revenue
GDP 
plus 
fiscal 
residuum
GDP 
minus 
revenue
GDP 
plus 
fiscal 
residuum
GDP 
minus 
revenue
GDP 
plus 
fiscal 
residuum
GDP
minus 
revenue
GDP 
plus 
fiscal 
residuum
Total flows (horizontal plus vertical)
(1) Central government 0.059 0.257 -0.284 -0.040 -0.468 -0.338 -0.450 -0.341
(0.009) (0.007) (0.032) (0.055) (0.075) (0.103) (0.061) (0.084)
(2) (1)+Regional governments 0.079 0.210 -0.337 0.251 -0.288 -0.437 -0.176 -0.356
(0.010) (0.032) (0.114) (0.156) (0.332) (0.445) (0.198) (0.291)
(3) (2)+Local governments 0.105 0.232 -0.351 0.341 -0.266 -0.407 -0.109 -0.330
(0.011) (0.037) (0.127) (0.160) (0.392) (0.454) (0.236) (0.291)
(4) (3)+Social security institutions 0.154 0.276 -0.550 0.354 -0.724 -0.403 -0.457 -0.302
(0.020) (0.036) (0.187) (0.161) (0.571) (0.437) (0.351) (0.285)
Horizontal flows
(5) Central government 0.023 0.194 -0.108 0.071 -0.158 -0.054 -0.155 -0.073
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.043) (0.024) (0.082) (0.022) (0.065)
(6) (1)+Regional governments 0.037 0.188 -0.146 0.438 0.005 0.012 0.083 0.099
(0.006) (0.010) (0.091) (0.095) (0.263) (0.145) (0.154) (0.127)
(7) (2)+Local governments 0.056 0.209 -0.148 0.493 0.041 0.031 0.151 0.127
(0.006) (0.014) (0.099) (0.108) (0.311) (0.161) (0.185) (0.139)
(8) (3)+Social security institutions 0.082 0.251 -0.251 0.514 -0.224 -0.044 -0.044 0.084
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(0.011) (0.015) (0.137) (0.099) (0.423) (0.152) (0.255) (0.144)
Source: based on data from Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Conti pubblici territoriali
White corrected standard errors in parentheses pertain to respectively  or 
Regional constants are included as regressors but not reported
The designated equations, to which 2, 1, 2 and 
3 refer, are as follows:
Equation (2):
Equation (3):
Equation (5):
Equation (6):
ititit xy µ ++= ~~ 22
ititiit xy 
 ++= 1
i tii tii t xxyy  += )(2
ititititit xxyy  += )~(~ 3
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Figure 1: Standardised per capita GDP in Lombardia and Campania (1996-2002, thousands of euro)
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1
 The literature usually disregards the effect of public sector policy on the equilibrium GDP or 
income. The analysis of the Keynesian effects is relevant in considering regional attitudes on 
separation from national states (BROSIO and REVELLI, 2003).
2
 Interest on the public debt is excluded in order to make the results comparable with those of the 
existing literature, which usually does not apportion interest expenditure on a regional basis, as the 
criteria for doing so would be highly arbitrary.
3
 For geographical, historical and cultural reasons, the Italian Constitution established 5 autonomous 
regions with special statutes, having broader spending powers than the ordinary statute regions and 
correspondingly larger financial transfers from the central government.
4
 This is the last year for which the data used in the empirical section of this paper are available.
5
 However, the reforms of local government finance adopted during the 1990s have almost halved 
this vertical fiscal gap for regions and municipalities.
6
 See ARACHI and ZANARDI (2004).
7 MINISTERO DELL’ECONOMIA E DELLE FINANZE, 
http://www.dps.mef.gov.it/cpt/banca_dati_home.asp
8
 The usefulness of the distinction is apparent in comparing our results here with the findings of 
PADOVANO (2007). Using data on the 20 Italian regions for 1963-2001, he estimates the degree of 
progression across jurisdictions of public sector revenues. The results show a geographically 
progressive tax regime for the period 1996-2001. In theory this would impl  a positive degree both 
of redistribution and of risk-sharing. Our own analysis, however, confirms only the redistributive 
and not the risk-sharing impact of public sector revenue; indeed, general government revenue 
actually appears to amplify idiosyncratic shocks.
9
 Following RAVN and UHLIG (2002) and MARAVALL and DEL RIO (2001) we set the penalty 
parameter equal to 7.
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10
 Short-sighted governments may underestimate the longer term negative consequences of deficits; 
pressure groups, in competing for resources, neglect the general repercussions on the public 
finances (the common pool problem). The result is a tendency for deficits to accumulate. As long as 
a deficit bias is present irrespective of cyclical conditions, pro-cyclical policies could emerge.
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